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Abstract
The continuing use of proprietary cryptography in embed-
ded systems across many industry verticals, from physical
access control systems and telecommunications to machine-
to-machine authentication, presents a significant obstacle
to black-box security-evaluation efforts. In-depth security
analysis requires locating and classifying the algorithm in
often very large binary images, thus rendering manual inspec-
tion, even when aided by heuristics, time consuming.
In this paper, we present a novel approach to automate
the identification and classification of (proprietary) crypto-
graphic primitives within binary code. Our approach is based
on Data Flow Graph (DFG) isomorphism, previously pro-
posed by Lestringant et al. [40]. Unfortunately, their DFG iso-
morphism approach is limited to known primitives only, and
relies on heuristics for selecting code fragments for analysis.
By combining the said approach with symbolic execution,
we overcome all limitations of [40], and are able to extend
the analysis into the domain of unknown, proprietary crypto-
graphic primitives. To demonstrate that our proposal is practi-
cal, we develop various signatures, each targeted at a distinct
class of cryptographic primitives, and present experimental
evaluations for each of them on a set of binaries, both pub-
licly available (and thus providing reproducible results), and
proprietary ones. Lastly, we provide a free and open-source
implementation of our approach, called Where’s Crypto?, in
the form of a plug-in for the popular IDA disassembler.
1 Introduction
Despite the widely-held academic consensus that cryptog-
raphy should be publicly documented [34, 37, 61], the use
of proprietary cryptography has persisted across many in-
dustry verticals ranging from physical access control sys-
tems [1,57,61,64,65,67] and telecommunications [23,27,52]
to machine-to-machine authentication [11, 61].
Particularly affected are embedded systems in industries
with complicated multi-tiered supply chains where system
integrators and OEMs end up integrating a significant number
of black-box components, leading to system opacity com-
pounded by the frequent absence of a Software Bill of Ma-
terials. Consequently, the use of a proprietary cryptographic
primitive high up in the supply chain can end up trickling
down in a wide variety of products by vendors essentially
unaware they are incorporating it.
This situation presents a significant obstacle to security-
evaluation efforts part of certification, compliance, secure
procurement or individual research since it requires resorting
to highly labor-intensive reverse-engineering in order to deter-
mine the presence and nature of these algorithms before they
can be evaluated. In addition when a proprietary algorithm
gets broken, details might not be published immediately as
a result of NDAs or court injunctions [5] leaving other po-
tentially affected parties to repeat such expensive efforts and
hampering effective vulnerability management. As such, there
is a real need for practical solutions to automatically scan bi-
naries for the presence of as-of-yet unknown cryptographic
algorithms.
Criteria In order to support the analysis of closed-source
embedded systems for the use of proprietary cryptography,
a suitable solution should meet the following criteria: (i)
identification of as-of-yet unknown cryptographic algorithms
falling within relevant taxonomical classes, (ii) efficient sup-
port of large, real-world embedded firmware binaries, and
(iii) no reliance on full firmware emulation or dynamic instru-
mentation due to issues around platform heterogeneity and
peripheral emulation. As discussed in Section 3, there is no
prior work meeting all of these criteria.
Approach To meet the above criteria, our approach bases
itself on a structural taxonomy of cryptographic primitives.
The idea is that, since the vast majority of proprietary cryptog-
raphy falls within established primitive classes [61], we can
develop structural signatures allowing for the identification
of any algorithm within these classes without having to rely
on knowledge of the algorithm’s particulars. To this end, we
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utilize a taxonomy based on [4, 36, 43, 47] and illustrated in
Figure 1. Note that this taxonomy is purely instrumental and
does not intend to be exhaustive or allow for an exclusive
partitioning of algorithms. Various ciphers could be classified
as part of multiple taxonomical classes but this presents no
problem to our purposes.
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Figure 1: Taxonomical tree of algorithm classes
Our approach is built on two fundamentals: Data Flow
Graph (DFG) isomorphism and symbolic execution. As de-
scribed in Section 4, the limitations of prior work on DFG
isomorphism [40] are overcome through augmentation with
symbolic execution which allows us to specify structural sig-
natures for taxonomic classes of cryptographic primitives and
analyze binary code for matches. Additionally, our focus for
this paper is on symmetric and unkeyed primitives only.
Contribution Our contribution is threefold. First, our novel
approach combines subgraph isomorphism with symbolic
execution, solving the open problem of fragment selection
and eliminating the need for heuristics and thus, overcoming
the limitations of prior work which rendered it unsuited to
identifying unknown ciphers. To the best of our knowledge,
as discussed in Section 3, there is currently no prior work
in either industry or academia that addresses the problem of
identifying unknown cryptographic algorithms.
Second, we propose a new domain-specific language (DSL)
for defining the structural properties of cryptographic prim-
itives. Clear guidelines are provided on using the new DSL
along with several examples.
Finally, a free and open-source proof-of-concept (PoC) im-
plementation, Where’s Crypto?, is made available1 and evalu-
ated in terms of analysis time and accuracy against relevant
real-world binaries.
1https://github.com/wheres-crypto/wheres-crypto
2 Scope and limitations
Normalization and optimization A single function can
be represented as many different combinations of assembly
instructions depending on architecture and compiler particu-
larities. Attempting to construct a 1-to-1 mapping between
semantic equivalence classes and DFGs is beyond the scope
of this work. When our normalization maps two expressions
to the same DFG node, they are semantically equivalent and
while the inverse is not necessarily true, our approach can
operate as if this were the case since, for a compiler to take
advantage of semantic equivalences, it must be consistently
aware of them and we can leverage this fact to recognize
compiler-generated equivalences.
Implicit flows Data dependencies may also arise due
to control-dependent assignments. For example, given
two boolean variables a and b, statements a ← b and
if a then b← true; else b← false are semantically
equivalent. In the former, b directly flows to a, and there-
fore the dependency is apparent in its corresponding DFG,
whereas in the latter, the dependency information is lost. Since
data dependent branches increase side-channel susceptibility,
developers should refrain from using them for cryptographic
primitives. Therefore, we declare this class of information
flows out of scope.
Function entry points Our PoC implementation relies on
IDA’s recognition of function entry points as input to our
algorithm. As such, inaccuracies in IDA’s function recogni-
tion will reduce our PoC’s coverage. However, this is not an
inherent limitation of our approach but merely of our PoC
implementation.
Code obfuscation Since code obfuscation presents an in-
herent challenge to any binary-analysis approach, our ap-
proach assumes that the input it operates on is not obfus-
cated and delegates this de-obfuscation to a manual and/or
automated pre-processing step.
Taxonomical constraints In our PoC evaluation and the ex-
amples of our DSL, we have limited our discussion to a subset
of the taxonomy of cryptographic primitives. This is not an
inherent limitation of our approach, but merely of our PoC
and its evaluation. Our approach is essentially agnostic with
respect to the employed taxonomy, which can be extended as
users see fit, and only assumes that the algorithm the analyst
is looking for is within one of its classes. Given that the vast
majority of proprietary cryptography falls within a specific
subset of established primitive classes [61], namely stream-
and block ciphers and hash functions, we do not consider this
a practical issue.
False positives Certain cryptographic primitives are essen-
tially underdefined. That is to say, their definitions are a sub-
set of other algorithms and code patterns and as such, their
matches are prone to false positives. We do not consider this
2
a serious practical problem, however, since our solution is
intended to assist a human analyst who will be easily capable
of pruning a limited number of false positives compared to
the burden of unassisted analysis required by the status quo.
Path oracle policy The path oracle policy discussed in Sec-
tion 6.1 is chosen such that the resulting graph represents n
iterations of an algorithm. While this typically satisfies our
goals, there are a few exceptions to this rule. First, compilers
sometimes ensure loop-guard evaluation during both entry
and exit, resulting in a DFG representing n+1 iterations. Sec-
ond, cryptographic primitives with a constant iteration length,
either inherently or as the result of function inlining, are be-
yond the control of the path oracle. Finally, loop unrolling
will result in a DFG representing kn iterations, where k de-
notes the number of compiler-grouped iterations. In order to
overcome this limitation, we suggest taking the possibility of
iteration count deviating from n into account during signa-
ture construction as described in Section 10, for example by
defining a minimum rather than an exact match.
3 Prior work
Prior work by academia and industry into the identification of
cryptographic algorithms in binary code can be divided into
(combinations of) the following approaches:
Dedicated functionality identification The most naive
and straight-forward approach consists of identifying dedi-
cated cryptographic functionality in the form of OS APIs (e.g.
Windows CryptoAPI/CNG) [44], library imports or dedicated
instructions (e.g. AES-NI). This approach is inherently inca-
pable of detecting unknown algorithms and as such unsuited
for our purposes.
Data signatures The most common approach employed in
practice [3, 33, 41, 42, 49, 53, 54, 68] consists of identifying
cryptographic algorithms on the basis of constants (e.g. IVs,
Nothing-Up-My-Sleeve Numbers, padding) and lookup tables
(e.g. S-Boxes, P-Boxes). This approach is unsuitable also
for detecting known algorithms that do not rely on easily
identifiable fixed data or have certain implementations, such
as dynamically generating S-Boxes rather than embedding
them.
Code heuristics Another series of approaches relies on
code heuristics which are applied either statically or dynam-
ically. One set of heuristics are code-augmented data signa-
tures, like mnemonic-constant tuples [32,39], which take into
account word sizes, endianness, and multiplicative and addi-
tive inverses but otherwise suffer from the same drawbacks
as data signatures.
A second heuristic relies on the observation that symmetric
cryptographic routines tend to consist of a high ratio of bit-
wise arithmetic instructions [16, 32, 39, 44, 53] and attempt to
classify functions based on a threshold. The drawback of this
approach is that it lacks granular taxonomical identification
capabilities as well as being highly prone to false positives,
especially on embedded systems where heavy bitwise arith-
metic is typically present as part of memory-mapped register
operations required for peripheral interaction.
Deep learning Hill et al. [35] have proposed a Dynamic
Convolutional Neural Network based approach which, how-
ever, is unsuited for our purposes due to its reliance on dy-
namic binary instrumentation and its inherent inability to
classify unknown algorithms.
Data flow analysis One set of approaches to data flow
analysis relies on the static relation between functions and
their inputs and outputs [17, 32, 44, 50]. One approach here
is to perform taint analysis and evaluate function I/O entropy
changes, which relies on emulation and as such is unsuit-
able as per our criteria in Section 1. Another approach is to
compare emulated or symbolically executed function I/O to a
collection of reference implementations or test vectors, which
is inherently incapable of detecting unknown algorithms.
Another approach [69] utilizes dynamic instrumentation
and symbolic execution to translate candidate cryptographic
algorithms into boolean formulas for subsequent comparison
to reference implementations using guided fuzzing. However,
the reliance of this approach on dynamic instrumentation and
its inherent inability to recognize unknown algorithms render
it unsuitable for our purposes.
Finally, there is the DFG isomorphism approach as pro-
posed by [40] which extracts DFGs from a given binary and
matches it against graphs of known cryptographic algorithms
through the use of Ullmann’s subgraph isomorphism algo-
rithm [60]. A DFG is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) repre-
senting the flow of data within a sequence of arithmetic/logic
operations. A vertex represents either an operation, or an in-
put variable. The presence of an edge between vertex v1 and
v2 means that v1 (or the result of operation v1) is an input to
operation v2. Due to the nature of DFGs, code flow informa-
tion cannot be expressed. As such, the contributions of [40]
are limited to linear sequences of instructions. Moreover, the
authors argue that since cryptographic implementations ought
to avoid data-dependent branching due to side-channel sus-
ceptibility, one can assume all cryptographic code is free from
any sort of conditional instructions. This latter generalization
introduces several limitations.
First, no straightforward strategy for selecting code frag-
ments is proposed. Performing the analysis on a per-function
basis is complicated by the fact that cryptographic implemen-
tations are commonly surrounded by some basic control logic,
such as checks on input parameters. As a result, analysis
can neither be applied to entire functions nor across function
boundaries through inlining and hence the authors propose a
limited set of selection heuristics constraining the work.
Second, the approach performs well when identifying
known algorithms since once the algorithm is known one
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can take advantage of unique characteristics but this does
not hold when attempting to identify unknown algorithms.
Furthermore, a common pattern is that the class of a cryp-
tographic primitive often only becomes apparent once the
analysis incorporates conditional instructions. We clarify this
point using the following toy examples.
Suppose that we would like to identify a proprietary stream
cipher σ. A typical implementation contains a key-stream gen-
erator, generating pseudo-random bytes in a loop. Inevitably,
this loop contains a conditional instruction causing the pro-
gram to either re-enter or exit the loop, depending on the
length parameter. As there is no support for conditional in-
structions depending on non-constant values, DFG G, gener-
ated from σ will, at most, represent a single iteration, covering
a single unit of input length (bytes or otherwise). In this typi-
cal example, clearly, a stream cipher pattern will not become
apparent in G. The example can be generalized to any pattern
that becomes apparent only after several iterations, where no
additional properties of the target primitive is known.
Similarly, suppose that we would like to identify a pro-
prietary hash function θ, based on a Merkle-Damgård con-
struction. θ invokes compression function F , which processes
blocks of fixed input length. The Merkle-Damgård construc-
tion is then used to allow variable input lengths. As such, in
order to generate a DFG wherein the construction is apparent,
we need it to incorporate several iterations, and perform inlin-
ing of F . The former is problematic (as per the stream cipher
example), and so is the latter in case F performs some kind
of input validation, e.g. checking for NULL pointers.
4 Solution overview
Cryptographic primitives are essentially a set of arithmetic
and logical operations representing an input/output relation.
This structural relationship between operations and data can
be expressed as a DFG. Since all particular algorithms will
be structurally similar to the general primitive defining their
taxonomical class, the problem of identifying an unknown
algorithm assumed to belong to a well-defined taxonomical
class can be formulated as a DFG subgraph isomorphism prob-
lem. However, due to slight differences in implementation
and compiler peculiarities, DFG representations of semanti-
cally identical algorithms may differ and such representations
require normalization before they can be subjected to iso-
morphism analysis. Lestringant et al. [40] demonstrated that,
by repeatedly applying a set of rewrite rules to the DFG, a
normalized version is obtained, wherein many of these varia-
tions are removed. Although no guarantee can be given that
equivalent semantics will always map to the same DFG, the
result is ‘good enough’ to serve as a data structure for the
purpose.
The identification procedure consists of three stages. A
diagram of the procedure is given in Figure 2. First, given the
entry point of a function, we start executing it symbolically.
A DFG is constructed during the execution, where each in-
struction adds a set of nodes and edges to the graph. In case
the symbolic analysis encounters a conditional instruction,
it may decide to explore both the true and false execution
paths. In such a case, the partially constructed DFG is copied
and the construction continues independently for both exe-
cution paths. Hence, the final result of the DFG construction
phase is, in fact, a set of DFGs describing the input/output
relation corresponding to the execution path taken. Section 5
describes the construction phase in detail.
Second, once a DFG is fully constructed, we enter the purg-
ing phase. This phase is responsible for removing nodes from
the graph that represent neither an output, nor a value used in
the computation of any output. As such, the graph is reduced
to a form in which it only represents the input/output rela-
tion, free from operations introduced due to register spilling
and other possible implementation, compiler, and architecture-
specific operations that are irrelevant to the function’s seman-
tics. Section 7 describes the purging phase in detail.
Last, with the finalized DFG at our disposal, we enter the
pattern-matching phase, where we search for subgraphs in
the DFG that are isomorphic to the graph signature of a given
cryptographic primitive. If such a subgraph is identified, we
conclude that the primitive is indeed present in the assembly
instructions from which the DFG was generated. We use
Ullmann’s subgraph isomorphism algorithm for searching
the DFG. Section 8 describes the pattern-matching phase in
detail.
5 Data Flow Graph construction
The approach of constructing the DFG from assembly instruc-
tions builds upon that of [40]. This section summarizes their
approach, and indicates where ours departs from it.
Suppose we have a sequence of assembly instructions. We
construct its corresponding DFG, G = (V,E), by converting
each instruction i into a set of operations Oi, which can po-
tentially be empty (e.g., a NOP or branch), or contain multiple
operations (e.g., a complex instruction). We distinguish three
cases based on input type, as follows:
Immediate We create a vertex representing a constant value
in G. It is linked by an edge to Oi.
Register In case an instruction takes a register as an input
operand, we create an edge between the last value written to
that register and Oi. In practice, this means we maintain an
array containing, for each register, a reference to the vertex in
G corresponding to that value.
Memory For operands that load or store from/to memory,
we create LOAD and STORE operations. Both operations take
a memory address vertex as input. Like any other vertex,
the address can be a constant, or a more complex symbolic
expression.
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Figure 2: Diagram of primitive identification process
Ideally, we would like all code fragments within a semantic
equivalence class to map to the same DFG, and have the end
result represent the semantics only, free from architecture and
compiler-specific traits. The approach followed by [40] is to
take the generated DFG, and repeatedly apply normalization
rewrite rules until a fixed-point is reached. This is where
our approach deviates from theirs, as we apply normalization
as well, but continuously during graph construction. This
enhances performance, which we argue below in Section 5.1,
and allows us to efficiently keep track of the conditions that
apply during symbolic execution (Section 6).
Processor module Broker DFG
1© Specification
5© Node reference
2© Normalization
3© Query existance
4© Node reference
Figure 3: Flow of the graph-node creation process
A diagram of the graph-node creation process is given in
Figure 3. More concretely: there is a processor module, writ-
ten for a specific architecture that translates each instruction
into graph nodes. The processor module cannot autonomously
create new graph nodes. Instead, it must interact with the bro-
ker. The broker is responsible for the application of normal-
ization rewrite rules and is processor-architecture agnostic.
The processor module provides a specification of the desired
node to the broker, which in turn applies normalization rewrite
rules to the specification. As such, the result matches the spec-
ification either exactly, or a different one that is semantically
equivalent. After normalization, the broker queries the DFG
for whether a node conforming to the normalized specification
already exists. If it does, a reference to it is returned, rather
than a new node being created. Consequently, there cannot
exist two distinct nodes in a graph conforming to the same
specification, or equivalent under normalization. We prove
this property in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Let G = (V,E) be a DFG, and h denote the nor-
malization transform, for which holds: (1) h(h(x)) = h(x) for
all x ∈U (universe). Consider arbitrary arithmetic/logical
operation op(v1,v2), where v1,v2 ∈V .
A broker request for op preserves the following properties:
(i) For all v ∈V , v = h(v), i.e. all nodes in G are normalized.
(ii) For all v1,v2 ∈ V , h(v1) = h(v2) =⇒ v1 = v2, i.e. all
nodes in G belong to a unique equivalence class under the
normalization function.
Proof. Assume (i) and (ii) hold for V . We define q =
h(op(v1,v2)) and distinguish two cases.
If q ∈V , then G is not modified and (i) and (ii) are trivially
preserved. If q 6∈V , then V ′=V ∪{q}. By applying (1), we get
h(q) = q, and thus (i) holds for {q}. Since (i) already holds for
V , (i) also holds for V ′. Furthermore, suppose that there exists
p ∈V , for which h(p) = h(q). By (i), we get h(p) = p, and
hence p = h(q). By definition, q = h(op(v1,v2)) and hence
p = h(h(op(v1,v2))). By (1), we get p = h(op(v1,v2)) and
thus p = q. This contradicts q 6∈V , and hence no p ∈V exists
such that h(p) = h(q). Therefore, (ii) holds for V ′.
Since (i) and (ii) trivially hold for the base case, i.e., an
empty graph G, where V =∅, and the above shows preserva-
tion during the step case, the properties hold for any G. E is
also subject to modifications, but they are not relevant for the
proof.
At this point, we are ready to describe the normalization
rewrite rules; they include operation simplification, common-
subexpression elimination, and subsequent memory access.
Operation simplification Suppose that we encounter an
arithmetic/logic operation for which all input parameters are
constants. Then, the operation can be replaced by its result.
4 12
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Likewise, in case an element is the identity element for the
operation it serves as an input to, the operation has no effect
and can be removed. In case an element is the zero element,
the operation’s result can be replaced by zero.
Common subexpression elimination Often within a code
fragment, the same value is re-computed several times. This is
especially true when the instruction set allows for expressing
complex operands, e.g. supporting offsets and shifts. Lemma 1
states that broker requests for nodes belonging to a certain
equivalence class all result in references to the same graph
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node. Hence, common-subexpression elimination is already
achieved by the design of the node-creation process.
SP
+
<<
R2 2
R0
+
<<
R2 2
SP
+
+
<<
R0
R2 2
Memory access Loading and storing of data from/to main
memory is a common operation. However, this need not have
a relation with semantics, but may due to register filling and
spilling. We attempt to correct for this by substituting each
LOAD operation by its result, which is known in case a preced-
ing STORE operation to the same memory address node exists.
It is important to be able to identify the potential equivalence
of memory address nodes passed to the STORE and LOAD op-
eration. Like any other expression, memory addresses are
represented by graph nodes. Given Lemma 1, all equivalent
address nodes are mapped to a single graph node. By main-
taining a lookup table during graph construction, e.g., a hash
table mapping address nodes to their corresponding stored
value, the substitution can be performed in constant time.
R3 +
SP 8
STORE
+
SP 8
LOAD
AND
0xff
+R3
SP 8
STORE
AND
0xff
For associative operations, the result does not depend on
the order in which they are executed. Therefore we translate
nested associative operations into a single operation taking
all inputs.
SP R0
+ 4
+
SP
R0
4
+
Miscellaneous translations Besides the rewrite rules de-
scribed above, we apply additional miscellaneous rules that
do not fit any of the aforementioned categories. They are
listed in Appendix B.
5.1 Advantages
Applying the normalization rewrite rules during construction
of the graph has several advantages over doing so once the
graph is fully generated. First, in case normalization function
h has constant running time complexity, then the running time
complexity of the construction phase, including normaliza-
tion, grows linearly with the number of assembly instructions,
whereas repeated application on a wholly generated DFG has
quadratic complexity.
Second, by Lemma 1, equivalence of any pair of node refer-
ences can be evaluated in constant time, simply by checking
whether v1 = v2. As such, substitution of LOAD operations by
their result can be achieved in constant time. The property
is also utilized extensively during symbolic execution (Sec-
tion 6). Suppose some predicate P restricts the domain of
node v1 ∈V . Then, a condition depending on v2 ∈V , can be
evaluated immediately without the need for proving equiva-
lence of v1 and v2 first.
6 Symbolic execution
During the analysis of a function, we may encounter con-
ditional instructions. By definition, a conditional instruction
carries a condition. We define the terms determined and under-
determined conditions. These terms relate to the terminology
used in the classification of systems of linear equations. For
determined conditions, the input variables are restricted to a
domain such that there is only a single possible evaluation re-
sult. For example, a conditional jump instruction at the end of
a loop consisting of a fixed number of iterations. Conversely,
for underdetermined conditions, the input variables are not
restricted enough to determine a fixed outcome. Below we
describe how we approach this class of conditions.
During the DFG construction of any function f , we keep
a state S = (G,P,B), where G = (V,E) is the partially con-
structed DFG. P is a predicate consisting of conditions that
apply. These conditions restrict unknown variables to a cer-
tain domain. We define predicate P so that satisfaction of
P guarantees that G represents the input/output relation of
f . The inverse of this statement need not be true. Finally,
backlog B is a mapping between an execution address and a
list of booleans. For all underdetermined conditional instruc-
tions encountered during the construction of G, B keeps a
record of which evaluation result was chosen (i.e., true/false).
Since the analysis may encounter the same conditional in-
struction several times, a list is kept. We define Be,i ∈ B, as
the evaluation result chosen during the ith occurrence of the
underdetermined conditional instruction located at execution
address e.
The graph construction begins by initializing S = (G,P,B)
to the empty state, i.e. G is an empty graph, P = true, and
B has no record of any evaluation result. Then, we begin the
construction by processing the instruction located at the entry
point of function f . Some instructions may manipulate the
execution flow, e.g., a branch instruction, in which case, we
continue the construction at its target address. The construc-
tion is complete when we encounter an instruction causing the
execution flow to return to f ’s calling function. For example,
in ARM assembly, this is achieved by writing the initial value
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of register LR, as set by the callee of f , to the program counter
register PC.
We represent a condition c in the form of a tuple (v1,o,v2),
where v1,v2 ∈ V , and o ∈ {<,≤,=,≥,>} is the operator.
c may be a determined condition. If either v1 or v2 is non-
constant, c need not be underdetermined, since predicate P
may sufficiently restrict v0 or v1 so that c is determined. Con-
versely, in case c is underdetermined, we are forced to choose
which execution path to follow. Alternatively, we may follow
both paths, by creating a copy of state S , and subsequently
assigning each execution path to one of the instances. This
way, the resulting final graph construction consists of several
DFGs; each one representing a different execution path. We
refer to this practice as forking state S . Forking at the occur-
rence of every underdetermined condition maximizes code
coverage. However, it is infeasible due to the state explosion
problem. Therefore, we should devise a balanced strategy for
when to apply it – as elaborated below.
6.1 Path Oracle
The strategy of when to apply forking only loosely relates
to the symbolic execution itself. Therefore, we introduce the
Path Oracle, a separate entity that is queried during the graph
construction phase, for every occurrence of an underdeter-
mined condition c. It decides whether c should evaluate to
true or false, or that the construction should fork and follow
both execution paths.
Algorithm 1 Conditional Instruction
Require: S = (G,P,B), ExecutionAddress e, Condition c, PathOracle po
if P∧ c = true then
Evaluate instruction at e
else if P∧ c = false then
Skip over instruction at e
else
d← po.query(e, B)
if d = TAKE_TRUE then
P← P∧ c . expand P with c
B← B∪ (e, true) . append decision to backlog
Evaluate instruction at e
else if d = TAKE_FALSE then
P← P∧¬c
B← B∪ (e, false)
Skip over instruction at e
else if d = TAKE_BOTH then
S ′ ← S .fork() . S ′ = (G′,P′,B′)
P← P∧ c
B← B∪ (e, true)
P′ ← P′ ∧¬c
B′ ← B′ ∪ (e, false)
e is evaluated for S , skipped for S ′
For every decision made by the path oracle, P and B in S are
updated accordingly. The pseudocode given in Algorithm 1
depicts how this is done. In short, predicate P is updated to
include condition c (or the negation thereof), thereby main-
taining satisfaction of its defining property, i.e. satisfaction of
P guarantees G represents the input/output relation of f . An
entry is added to backlog B, reflecting the decision made by
the path oracle. B has no purpose beyond weighing into the
decisions made by the path oracle.
6.1.1 Path Oracle Policy
Through experimental evaluation, we settled on the following
policy for the path oracle: the goal of the policy is, for some
number n, to obtain a DFG representing exactly n iterations of
a primitive with variable input length. The primitive can sub-
sequently be identified by searching for a pattern consisting
of exactly n iterations in the resulting DFG.
We define de,i ∈ {TAKE_TRUE,TAKE_FALSE,TAKE_BOTH}
as the path oracle’s decision for the ith query for the condi-
tional instruction found at execution address e. The policy for
the path oracle is defined as follows:
de,0 := TAKE_BOTH
de,i :=
{
TAKE_TRUE iff Be,0 = true,
}
∀i ∈ [1,n−1]TAKE_FALSE iff Be,0 = false
de,i :=
{
TAKE_FALSE iff Be,0 = true,
}
∀i ∈ [n,∞]TAKE_TRUE iff Be,0 = false
We justify the choice of policy by means of an example.
Suppose that we encounter an underdetermined condition
c at address e. We do not know which of the two possible
execution paths leads to a cryptographic primitive (if any).
Hence, for i = 0, i.e., the first occurrence, we fork the state
and explore both. Suppose that, at a later point during the
graph construction, one instance visits address e again, hence
i= 1, and finds itself with another underdetermined condition
c′. Since, at this point, P incorporates c (or ¬c), the outcome
of c can be evaluated. As c′ is underdetermined, c 6= c′ is
guaranteed.
Such behavior is typical for a loop-guard statement. If this
is indeed the case, the execution path taken at i = 0 made us
revisit e. In light of our goal of constructing a DFG compris-
ing of n iterations of a primitive, we replicate this path choice
n−1 times, and subsequently take the opposite path, causing
the execution flow to exit the loop. Finally, the construction
phase yields two DFGs: one representing 0 iterations, and
another representing n iterations. A description of the strategy
being applied to a concrete example is given in Appendix A.
Furthermore, since each conditional instruction may intro-
duce at most one additional DFG, the total number of DFGs
generated from f is finite.
7 Purging process
Once the construction is complete, graph G represents the in-
put/output relation of function f , given predicate P. However,
it contains other information as well, such as nodes created
from temporary STORE operations to the stack, and expres-
sions rewritten by the broker, leaving the source nodes unused.
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For example, suppose that v represents ADD(x,y). Then, a re-
quest to the broker for ADD(v,z) yields node w, representing
ADD(x,y,z). w does not depend on v and, unless v is referenced
independently elsewhere, v is not part of f ’s input/output re-
lation.
Leaf nodes are, by definition, graph nodes that are not used
as an input to any arithmetic/logical operation. Our approach
becomes the following: for each leaf node v, we check whether
it is part of f ’s semantics. We consider leaf node v to be part
of f ’s semantics, if v is either
(i) the return value of f ,
(ii) a STORE operation, and the target address is not relative
to the SP register. Thus, information is stored outside of
the stack, or
(iii) a CALL operation, i.e. a function call not subject to inlin-
ing.
In case none of the above applies, v and its incoming edges
can be removed from G, without affecting semantics. The
removal of leaf nodes continues repeatedly until no more
nodes can be removed. Finally, by construction, all nodes
in G are either leaf nodes that are part of f ’s semantics, or
intermediate results contributing to some leaf.
8 Signature Expression
IDENTIFIER string VARIANT string
TRANSIENT label :
expression ;
VARIANT string
Figure 4: High-level overview of state machine for the signa-
ture DSL
In order to detect subgraph isomorphism, we need a means
of expressing the signature graph. Figure 4 depicts a diagram
of the signature domain-specific language (DSL). Appendix C
provides a concrete example. The round boxes denote a key-
word, whereas the square boxes denote a data type. New
graph nodes are generated through the expression data type.
Its specification is described below. The IDENTIFIER keyword
allows one to specify a friendly name for the signature. The
VARIANT keyword enforces the creation of a new empty DFG.
Subsequent expressions are added to this graph. Subgraph
isomorphism detection is performed with all graphs belong-
ing to a signature definition, allowing one to specify multiple
variants of a signature. The label data type is an optional
field. It allows the node to be referenced by another expres-
sion, enabling node sharing between expressions. Analogous
to assembly instructions, a DFG declared in the expression
language is also subject to the normalization process by the
broker (Section 5), and subsequently subject to the purging
process (Section 7). In case the TRANSIENT keyword is spec-
ified, the node created from the expression is considered to
be non-essential, and may be removed during the purging
process in case it was translated by the broker.
expression + expression
+
expression
<<
>>
expression
OPAQUE
< clamp-label >
STORE
LOAD
XOR
OR
AND
MULT
ROTATE
( expression
,
)
label
literal
Figure 5: State machine for ‘expression’ type
A diagram of the expression data type is given in Figure 5.
It is recursively defined, and hence allows for nested subex-
pressions. The + keyword denotes the addition of two or
more subexpressions. The <</>> keywords denote a left and
right shift, respectively. The label data type is a reference
to a previously defined graph node. The literal data type de-
notes a constant value. The STORE, LOAD, XOR, OR, AND,
MULT and ROTATE keywords followed by subexpressions sur-
rounded by parentheses provoke creation of a new graph node.
The following subexpressions serve as input nodes. Finally,
the OPAQUE keyword signifies a special wildcard node. A
comparison against a node of any other type by the subgraph-
isomorphism algorithm always yields true. The opaque node
type can have any number of input nodes, including zero. The
optional clamp-label data type allows one to assign a name to
the node type. Consequently, a comparison against a node of
any other type yields true, with the restriction that all opaque
nodes carrying the same type label must map to nodes of the
same type. We refer to this practice as type clamping.
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Within the realm of identifying unknown primitives, defin-
ing a special wildcard applicable to a group of nodes would
make sense. However, to the best of our knowledge, the nature
of subgraph-isomorphism algorithms does not allow for the
augmentation of any such algorithm to support one-to-many
mappings. Alternatively, one may declare several variants
of a signature, where for each variant, the opaque group is
denoted by a different number of nested opaque operations,
i.e. OPAQUE, OPAQUE(OPAQUE), etc. This way, any group con-
sisting of a finite number of operations can be expressed. A
particular syntax could trigger the translation automatically.
However, the number of variants grows exponentially in the
number of times this hypothetical syntax is used, dramatically
affecting the running time of the analysis. Therefore, we omit
the syntax altogether and enforce the explicit declaration of
multiple variants.
9 Subgraph isomorphism
Subgraph isomorphism is a well-documented problem, and
is known to be NP complete. The solution proposed by Ull-
mann [60] is a recursion backtracking algorithm with pruning.
Our framework implements this algorithm, with support for
type clamping (see Section 8). For brevity, we avoid further
details about Ullmann’s algorithm and our optimizations to it
here, and refer the reader to the documentation included with
our framework’s source code instead.
Support for type clamping is implemented in the prune
routine of the algorithm. Each time a candidate node c in
the code graph is assigned to another node e in the signature
graph, a check is introduced whether e carries the opaque
type, and a clamp label. If so, the clamp label l is checked for
previous assignment to a particular node type. If not, then l is
assigned to type(c), the type of the code node. At that point,
all candidates c′ for opaque signatures nodes carrying clamp
label l, for which type(c) 6= type(c′), are invalidated.
10 Signatures
Before diving into the practical performance evaluation, we
highlight the signatures used throughout the analysis, along
with relevant details and a motivation as to why they are
included. All signature definition files are included in our im-
plementation of the framework. The list given below should
not be interpreted as an attempt to cover the entirety of cryp-
tographic primitives in existence. Rather, they showcase the
applicability of our framework. The selection of signatures
was made with a strong focus on proprietary algorithms in
embedded environments. As such, they consist of symmetric
and unkeyed primitives only, although there is no fundamental
incompatibility with asymmetric primitives.
10.1 AES, MD5, SHA1
Despite this paper’s strong focus on unknown primitives, there
are several arguments to be made for the inclusion of AES,
MD5 and SHA1. First, they allow for corroboration of, and
straight comparison with the result by [40]. Second, and more
importantly, they demonstrate that our proposed symbolic exe-
cution approach effectively solves the code fragment selection
problem, without resorting to heuristics.
10.2 Feistel cipher
L0 R0
XOR F
K0
XOR F
K1
...
Figure 6: DFG of a Feis-
tel structure
A Feistel cipher is a symmet-
ric structure used in many
block ciphers, including DES.
Hence, a generic classifier
capable of identifying them
poses an interesting use case.
In a Feistel cipher, a plaintext
block P is split in two pieces
L0 and R0. Then, for each
round i ∈ [0,1, . . . ,n], compute
Li+1 = Ri
Ri+1 = Li⊕F(Ri,Ki),
where ⊕ denotes bitwise
exclusive-or, F the round
function, and Ki the sub-key
for round i. Translating this
definition into a DFG, one
yields the graph provided in
Figure 6.
The next step is to construct a signature that represents the
DFG from Figure 6. However, F is an algorithm-specific set
of operations, of which thus no properties are known. The
OPAQUE operator (see Section 8), is applicable to a single
node only, whereas F consists of an unknown number of
operations. F is known to take Ri and Ki as an input, where
i ∈ [0,1, . . . ,n]. No properties are known for Ki. Hence, we
represent F by introducing several variants of the signature.
In the first, we substitute F with OPAQUE(Ri), in the second
with OPAQUE(OPAQUE(Ri)), etc., until we reach 8 levels of
operations. Thus, the signature identifies Feistel ciphers with
an F whose input/output relation contains between 1 and 8
successive operations.
10.3 (Non-)Linear feedback shift register
(Non-)Linear feedback shift registers ((N)LFSRs) are often
used in pseudo-random number generators, and key-stream
generators for stream ciphers. When designed carefully, an
(N)LFSR offers relatively strong randomness, whilst requiring
very few logic gates, often making it an attractive choice
for algorithms designed for use in embedded devices. Both
hardware and software implementations of (N)LFSRs are
common.
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An (N)LFSR R is initialized with a seed value. Each
round, a new bit is generated using the feedback function
L from a subset of the bits in the current state of R. R is an
LFSR, if L is linear, e.g. an exclusive-or over the input bits.
Conversely, R is an NLFSR if L is non-linear. All bits in
register R are shifted one position to the left, discarding the
most significant bit, and the newly generated bit is placed
at position 0. Subsequently, an output bit is generated by
feeding R to some function F . Hence, we have R0 = seed.
Then, for each round i ∈ [0,1, . . . ,n],
R0 F
1<<
OR
L
F
1<<
OR
L
F
...
Figure 7: DFG of an (N)LFSR
Ri+1 = (Ri << 1) | L(Ri)
outputi = F(Ri),
where << x denotes a
left shift by x bits and |
denotes bitwise OR.
Figure 7 depicts a
translation of the defini-
tion given above into a
DFG. In order to express
this graph in a signa-
ture, we replace L and F
with OPAQUE operators.
The property that Ri+1
depends on Ri via L is
lost. However, the signa-
ture remains distinctive
enough in order to war-
rant very few false posi-
tives (see Section 11).
10.4 Sequential Block Permutation
Variable-length primitives constructed from fixed-length ones
are a common phenomenon. For example, all hash functions
built on the Merkle-Damgård construction have this character-
istic, such as MD5, SHA1 and SHA2. Other examples include
block ciphers in a chaining mode of operation. We refer to
this construct as a sequential block permutation.
Let Hi be the ith output block of a sequential block permu-
tation function, Bi be the ith input block, c be the fixed-length
compression function, for i ∈ [0,1, . . . ,n]. I denotes the
initialization vector. Then, we define the sequential block
permutation as
H0 = c(I,B0)
Hi = c(Hi−1,Bi) ∀i ∈ [1,n]
A DFG representation of this definition is given in Figure 8.
On inspection we find that it only provides structural guidance,
and does not prescribe any arithmetic or logic operations. The
definition of H prescribes that compression function c takes
two inputs:
(i) The output of its preceding instance, except for the first
instance, which depends on the IV.
(ii) Any of the input blocks B0,B1, . . . ,Bn.
I
B0c
B1c
B2c
...
c Bn
Figure 8: DFG of
a sequential block
permutation. The
blue arrows depict
the visitation order
by the classifier
In order to express this in a signa-
ture definition, we may opt to use an
approach similar to how the Feistel
cipher signature definition is con-
structed. However, Figure 8 does
not define any operation that serves
as an ‘anchor point’ for c, analogous
to the XOR-operation in the Feistel
structure. As such, any pattern of
repeated operations satisfies prop-
erty (i). Hence, we must also take
property (ii) into account. Let ci be
the ith instance of c. The number of
arithmetic/logical operations in ci
transforming the output of ci−1 need
not be related to that of input block
Bi. Therefore, in order to translate
c into several variants of the signa-
ture, we have to perform a transla-
tion for both the path between ci
and ci−1, and that between ci and
Bi. The number of variants grows
exponentially in the number of such translations. On top of
that, the compression function c can be vastly more complex
than a round function in a Feistel cipher. For example, the
MD5 compression function in itself consists of 64 rounds.
Therefore, the upper bound of the number of operations that
c may consist of is an order of magnitude higher than what
one would typically find in a Feistel cipher’s round function.
All in all, we conclude that the number of signature variants,
and therewith the running time complexity of the analysis,
becomes prohibitively large.
Fortunately, there is no need to restrict ourselves to sub-
graph isomorphism as a means of identifying primitives.
Rather, we can apply any algorithm to the DFGs generated by
the graph construction framework, which is our approach for
the sequential block permutation use case. We take several
observations into account. First, input blocks B0,B1, . . . ,Bn
are typically loaded from a memory address. Second, c has a
fixed (unknown) block size, and thus we can safely assume
that the offsets between the load addresses of Bi, Bi+1 and
Bi+2 are constant. From these observations, we devise the
following approach:
(i) We identify all nodes representing LOAD(ADD(x,k)),
where x is an arbitrary graph node, and k is a con-
stant. For each instance of x, we construct a list of tuples
(v0,v1,v2), where vi represents LOAD(ADD(x,ki)). A tu-
ple is valid only if k1− k0 ≥ 16∧ k1− k0 = k2− k1, i.e.
the offsets between v0,v1 and v2 are constant, and at
least 16 bytes. As such, a DFG generated from a sequen-
tial block permutation function yields at least one tuple
such that vi maps to Bi, for all i ∈ [0,1,2].
(ii) For all tuples, we determine the shortest path between v0
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and v1. This can be done by means of a simple breadth-
first search. If v0 maps to B0 and v1 to B1, then this path
should take us through two instances of c (see Figure 8).
(iii) Suppose that such a path exists, then we would like to
confirm that a similar path exists between v1 and v2. We
take v1 as a starting point, and traverse paths with edge
directions and node types resembling those on the path
between v0 and v1. Once such a path has been found, it
should reach v2. Satisfaction of this property is a strong
positive indicator.
(iv) To gain more certainty, we also verify that the node types
of all inputs and outputs for all the nodes on both paths
match. However, in case v0 maps to B0, some inputs
may originate from the IV, whereas they originate from
computed values during the second round. Therefore,
we tolerate constant inputs and inputs of type LOAD in
this step.
The definition given in this section resembles exactly that
of the Merkle-Damgård construction, with the omission of the
padding function applied to the last block. We studied the pos-
sibility of creating a Merkle-Damgård classifier built on the
sequential block permutation classifier. This appeared to be
infeasible due to a combination of factors. First, no concrete
data dependencies are defined for the padding function, but
only a set of properties (see [31] for so-called MD-compliant
padding). If we assume that the padding function encodes the
input length, then the final instance of compression function c
should take a node representing it as an input. Therefore, we
have to reliably determine the input length, which need not
coincide with n (see Section 2), identify the final instance of c,
which depends on whether the encoded input length fits within
the padding space, and make additional assumptions about
the length encoding. As such, we conclude the distinction of
the Merkle-Damgård construction within the broader class
of sequential block permutation functions relies on too many
assumptions, and leave it as a manual effort for the human
analyst.
11 Experimental evaluation
We evaluate our solution’s performance with respect to ac-
curacy and running time on the following three test sets: (a)
a collection of shared libraries and executables part of the
OpenWRT2 network equipment firmware, (b) a collection of
proprietary cipher implementations built from public sources,
and (c) a collection of representative real-world embedded
firmwares from relevant verticals (PLCs, ECUs).
While not containing proprietary cryptography, the Open-
WRT project is publicly available without legal issues around
redistribution, contrary to firmwares which do. As such, this
2https://openwrt.org
evaluation benefits the reproducibility of our work, as well as
demonstrates the general principle, accuracy and performance
of our work on a test set representative of high-end embedded
device firmware. Given the uncertainty over the legality of
redistribution, we refer to the original sources of the propri-
etary cipher implementations rather than publish our binary
test set. Due to copyright restrictions, we unfortunately lack
permission to publish the real-world embedded firmwares.
11.1 Performance on OpenWRT binaries
The empirical evaluation is conducted on an AMD Ryzen
3600 machine with 16 GB of RAM, which is considered to
be mid-range hardware nowadays. The version of OpenWRT
used is 19.07.2, which is the latest version at time of writing.
We begin by investigating the impact of the parameters de-
fined throughout this paper. We do this by running the analysis
on libcrypto.so.1.1, taking on different parameter values, and
measuring performance in terms of running time and accu-
racy. We then choose sensible parameter values based on a
trade-off between the two, and use them for the remainder of
the section, unless specified otherwise.
Section 6.1.1 defines n, the target number of iterations. The
(N)LFSR and sequential block permutation classifiers are af-
fected by this value. The others target a single instance only.
The latter identifies two successive instances of some com-
pression function c. The IV and length padding may provoke
differences in the DFG in the first and the last instance of
c, respectively. Taking n = 4 circumvents this. A pattern of
4 successive (N)LSFR rounds is also sufficiently distinctive.
Therefore, for the remainder of this section, we take n = 4.
Formally, the construction of a DFG from binary code,
as described in Section 5, is a special case of execution,
and is thus affected by the halting problem. As such, graph-
construction is not guaranteed to terminate. Therefore, we
introduce a graph construction timeout ttimeout. Figure 9a de-
picts a histogram of graph construction time t for all graphs
constructed during the analysis of libcrypto.so.1.1. It shows
that, for the vast majority of all graphs, construction completes
within 10s. Thus, we take ttimeout = 10s.
Figure 9b depicts the time taken to complete the entire
analysis pipeline over every function in libcrypto.so.1.1, under
the influence of varying inline depth d. Figure 9c contains
accuracy measurements for each signature. True negatives are
omitted since they cover an overwhelming majority of results,
and thus impact readability. Before discussing the results,
we will first provide guidelines on how the chart should be
interpreted. Recall that the signature evaluation is performed
on graphs, and the graph construction step may yield several
graphs. As such, several signature evaluation results may exist
per function. The measurements provided in Figure 9c are
aggregated on a per-function level.
Let f be any function in the binary under analysis, and let
signature sα denote a signature whose goal is to identify prim-
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Figure 9: Effect of inline depth d and ttimeout for libcrypto.so.1.1
itive α. Furthermore, let F be the set of DFGs generated from
f during the graph construction phase. Finally, match(sα,G)
denotes that signature sα was identified in graph G, imp(f ,α)
denotes that f implements cryptographic primitive α.
A result is marked as a true positive if imp(f ,α)∧∃G.G ∈
F ∧match(sα,G), i.e. f implements cryptographic primitive
α, and its signature is found in at least one graph in F . In-
deed, there is no guarantee that all DFGs in F contain al-
gorithm α, and hence it is expected that the signature is not
found in every graph in F . A result is marked as a false pos-
itive if ¬imp(f ,α)∧ ∃G.G ∈ F ∧match(sα,G), i.e. f does
Algorithm
signature dropbear libcrypto.so.1.1 libmbedcrypto.so.2.16.31 libnettle.so.7.02
size 145 KB 1,735 KB 197 KB 237 KB
analysis time 6m44s 39m47s 6m56s 11m32s
SHA1
sha1 X Unlabeled3 X SHA1_Update X sha1_update_ret X sha1_compress
bl.perm. X Unlabeled3 X SHA1_Update X sha1_update_ret X sha1_update4
SHA256
bl.perm. X Unlabeled3 X SHA256_Update5 X sha256_update_ret X sha256_update45
AES
aes X Unlabeled3 X AES_encrypt X aes_encrypt X aes_encrypt_armv6
MD4
bl.perm. N/A XMD4_Update N/A X md4_update4
MD5
md5 N/A XMD5_Update X md5_update_ret X hmac_md5_update
bl.perm. N/A XMD5_Update X md5_update_ret X hmac_md5_update
RIPEMD160
bl.perm. N/A X RIPEMD160_Update N/A X hmac_ripemd160_update
SHA512
bl.perm. N/A X SHA512_Update5 X sha512_process5 X sha512_update5
SM3
bl.perm. N/A X sm3_block_data_order N/A N/A
BLOWFISH
feistel N/A X BF_encrypt X blowfish_crypt_ecb4 X blowfish_encrypt
CAMELLIA
feistel N/A X Camellia_EncryptBlock N/A X camellia_crypt
CAST
feistel N/A X CAST_ecb_encrypt N/A X cast128_encrypt
DES
feistel N/A X DES_encrypt2 N/A X des_encrypt
RC2
feistel N/A 7 RC2_encrypt N/A N/A
SEED
feistel N/A X SEED_encrypt N/A N/A
SM4
feistel N/A X SM4_encrypt N/A N/A
GOST
feistel N/A N/A N/A X gosthash94_digest
MD2
bl.perm. N/A N/A N/A X md2_update
TWOFISH
feistel N/A N/A N/A 7 twofish_encrypt
1 Symbols prefixed with mbedtls_
2 Symbols prefixed with nettle_
3 Misclassified by IDA as an integer array. Manual cast to function
required.
4 Positive match for d ≥ 4.
5 Positive match for ttimeout ≥ 30s.
Table 1: Analysis result for various binaries in OpenWRT
not implement primitive α, yet its signature is found in at
least one graph in F . A result is marked as a true negative if
¬imp(f ,α)∧¬∃G.G ∈ F ∧match(sα,G). A result is a false
negative if imp(f ,α)∧¬∃G.G ∈ F ∧match(sα,G).
The results in Figure 9c show that accuracy does not
substantially improve when choosing d > 2. However, do-
ing so does impact the running time. We conclude that, for
libcrypto.so.1.1, d = 2 is a reasonable trade-off between ac-
curacy and running time. As such, we take d = 2 for the
remainder of this section, unless specified otherwise.
At this point, sensible values for n, d and ttimeout have been
selected. We continue the evaluation by feeding various bina-
ries within OpenWRT containing cryptographic primitives to
our analysis framework. The results are listed in Table 1. Each
cell in the table depicts the symbol name in the corresponding
binary of the first positive result, or, in case of a false negative,
the symbol name where a positive result is expected.
The above results indicate our solution is capable of suc-
cessfully identifying the vast majority of cryptographic prim-
itives present in various binaries in timely manner. Should
accuracy take precedence over performance, it is possible to
tune the discussed parameters to improve detection.
11.2 Performance on proprietary algorithms
In this section, we turn our attention to proprietary algorithms.
Most algorithms included in this section were originally con-
fidential, but have been leaked to the public or reverse en-
gineered. As such, source code for all samples is publicly
available. Due to uncertainty over the legality of redistribu-
tion, we point to the original sources for reference.
11.2.1 Cryptographic algorithms
Table 2 depicts the analysis results for various proprietary
algorithms. A description, the analysis result, and other rele-
vant information is condensed into a single table due to space
restrictions. All algorithms are successfully identified, with
the exception of Red Pike. We found that the cipher’s struc-
ture only loosely resembles a Feistel network; an addition is
used instead of the exclusive-or operation (see Section 10.2).
Hence, it is arguably not a Feistel cipher. The possibility that
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Algorithm Description Reverse- Cryptanalysis Original Target signature
engineered source
CRYPTO1 Cipher used in the Mifare Classic family of RFID tags. [28, 51] [18, 22, 28, 29, 46] 3 X (N)LFSR1
HITAG2 Cipher used in vehicle immobilizers. [66] [20, 55, 56, 58, 62] 4 X (N)LFSR1
A5-1 Provides of over-the-air privacy for communication in GSM. [14] [6, 9, 45] 5 X (N)LFSR1
A5-2 GSM export cipher. [14] [30] 5 X (N)LFSR1
A5-GMR Cipher used in GMR, a standard for satellite phones. Heavily inspired by A5/2. [23] [23, 24] 6 X (N)LFSR1
RED PIKE Classified UK government encryption algorithm. [21] - 7 7 Feistel cipher
COMP128 Family of algorithms used for session key and MAC generation in GSM. [13, 59] [15] 8 X Block permutation
KASUMI Feistel cipher used for the confidentiality and integrity of 3G. - [8, 25, 38] 9 X Feistel cipher
MULTI2 A block cipher used for broadcast scrambling in Japan. - [2] 10 X Feistel cipher
DST40 Digital Signature Transponder cipher, often found in vehicle immobilizers. [12] [12] 11 X (N)LFSR
KEELOQ Block cipher used in remote keyless entry systems and home automation. [48] [7, 10, 19, 26] 12 13 X (N)LFSR
1 Positive match for d ≥ 4
Table 2: Analysis result for proprietary samples
Algorithm
signature CWM0576 CWX0470 M340 VW
size 1,717 KB 1,344 KB 4,133 KB 512 KB
analysis time 88m14s 45m53s 83m11s 11m45s
DES
feistel XMatch XMatch N/A N/A
AES
aes XMatch N/A N/A N/A
bl.perm. XMatch N/A N/A N/A
MD5
md5 XMatch XMatch XMatch N/A
bl.perm. XMatch XMatch XMatch N/A
MEGAMOS
(n)lfsr N/A N/A N/A 7 No match
Table 3: Analysis result for various firmware images
its source code does not originate from a genuine source could
be an explanation here.
11.2.2 Firmware Images
The test set of representative real-world firmwares consists of
images for the Emerson ControlWave Micro RTU, Emerson
ControlWave XFC flow computer, Schneider Electric M340
PLC and Volkswagen IPC. The size, nature and complexity
of these images ensure test-set realism.
Table 3 depicts the analysis result for all the firmwares. To
the best of our knowledge, the table covers all cryptographic
algorithms present in the sample set of firmware images. The
images are ‘flat’ binaries and hence symbol names are absent.
3
https://github.com/nfc-tools/mfcuk/blob/master/src/crypto1.c
4
http://cryptolib.com/ciphers/hitag2/
5
https://cryptome.org/gsm-a512.htm
6
https://github.com/marcelmaatkamp/gnuradio-osmocom-gmr/blob/master/src/l1/a5.c
7
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Pike_(cipher)
8
https://github.com/osmocom/libosmocore/blob/master/src/gsm/comp128.c
9
https://github.com/osmocom/libosmocore/blob/master/src/gsm/kasumi.c
10
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/core/lib/libtomcrypt/src/ciphers/multi2.c
11
https://github.com/jok40/dst40/blob/HEAD/software/dst40test/dst40.c
12
https://github.com/hadipourh/KeeLoq
13
http://cryptolib.com/ciphers/keeloq/
The results show that all the cryptographic primitives were
identified, except for the Megamos cipher. Verdult et al. [63]
revealed that the Megamos cipher contains an NLFSR, and
thus, the analysis should point this out. Further examination
reveals that the non-linear feedback function is implemented
as a subroutine, and the shift register is updated depending on
its return value via an if-statement. This is a direct violation of
the implicit flow limitation inherent to DFG-based approaches
discussed in Section 2.
12 Conclusions
Despite the ubiquitous availability of royalty-free, publicly
documented, and peer-reviewed cryptographic primitives
and implementations, proprietary alternatives have persisted
across many industry verticals, especially in embedded sys-
tems. Due to the undocumented and proprietary nature of said
primitives, subjecting them to security analysis often requires
locating and classifying them in often very large binary im-
ages, which is a time-consuming, labor-intensive effort, even
when aided by heuristics.
In order to overcome this obstacle in an automated fashion,
a solution should have the capability of identifying as-of-yet
unknown cryptographic algorithms, support large, real-world
firmware binaries, and not depend on peripheral emulation.
As of yet, no prior work exists that satisfies these criteria.
Our novel approach combines DFG isomorphism with sym-
bolic execution, and introduces a specialized DSL in order to
enable identification of unknown proprietary cryptographic
algorithms falling within well-defined taxonomical classes.
The approach is the first of its kind, is architecture and plat-
form agnostic, and performs well in terms of both accuracy
and running time on real-world binary firmware images.
Future work DFGs do not allow for the expression of code
flow information. Potentially valuable indicators, such as
whether two nodes originate from the same execution ad-
dress, hinting to a round function, are therefore lost. We leave
the incorporation of code flow information for future work.
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A Path Oracle Policy – an example
1 MOV R4, #0 ; set R4 to 0
2 _begin:
3 CMP R4, R8 ; compare R4 to R8
4 BGE _end ; break loop if R4 >= R8
5 LDRB R5, [R4, R7] ; load R7[R4] into R5
6 BL <keystream_generator> ; call generator
7 EOR R5, R0, R5 ; XOR output byte with R5
8 STRB R5, [R4, R6] ; store result at R6[R4]
9 ADD R4, R4, #1 ; increment R4
10 B _begin ; continue at beginning
11 _end:
Figure 10: Example stream cipher ARM assembly snippet
A practical example Suppose the graph construction is run
on the example ARM assembly snippet displayed in Figure 10.
We start with S = (G,P,B), with P = true. Line 4 contains
conditional instruction Branch Greater/Equal (BGE). During
the first visit of this instruction, we have i = 0, P = true, and
c= (R8≤ 0). Since R8 is unknown, c is underdetermined. The
path oracle policy prescribes TAKE_BOTH. Thus, we get P =
(R8≤ 0), B4,0 = true, and S ′ = (G′,P′,B′), with P′ = (R8>
0) and B′4,0 = false. For state S , the instruction is evaluated,
and thus the construction continues on line 11, and hence
terminates. For S ′, the instruction is skipped, thereby visiting
the body of the loop. Eventually, S ′ revisits the instruction at
line 4. This time we have c = (R8≤ 1), i = 1, P′ = (R8> 0)
and B′4,0 = false. Since P
′∧ c is underdetermined, we query
the path oracle, and obtain TAKE_FALSE, causing another visit
of the loop’s body. Finally, at i = n, we get c = R8 ≤ n and
P′=(R8> n−1). We obtain TAKE_TRUE from the path oracle.
Thus, the construction terminates. We obtain two graphs; one
corresponding to predicate R8≤ 0, and another corresponding
to R8= n. The latter describes n iterations of the algorithm,
exactly conforming to our goal. The former describes zero
iterations, and thus, contains a negligible amount of nodes.
Therefore, we accept the small amount of overhead this graph
induces during later stages of the analysis.
B Miscellaneous rewrite rules
Besides the rewrite rules already described, we apply ad-
ditional miscellaneous rules. They were conceived through
continuous application of our framework to code fragments
from various sources, and subsequent stumbling upon varia-
tions between the processed result generated from supposedly
semantically equivalent code. We highlight these rules here.
There are various means of doubling the value of an arbi-
trary expression x. For example, MULT(x,2), but also ADD(x,x)
and x<<1. We represent all variants by MULT(x,2).
R1
+
R1 2
MULT
Furthermore, suppose we have an arbitrary expression x, and
constants c1 and c2. Then, the results of AND(x >> c1,c2)
and AND(ROTATE(x,c1),c2), are equivalent if c2 < 232−c1 and
c1 < 32, for a 32-bit architecture. This property is sometimes
exploited by compilers in order to minimize code size, par-
ticularly in cases where the underlying architecture supports
complex instruction operands that allow for rotation, but no
shifting. In such a scenario, we represent both variants by
AND(x >> c1,c2).
R4
ROT
8
AND
0xff
R4
>>
8
AND
0xff
Lastly, we distribute multiplications over additions.
R3
+
4
MULT
2
R3
MULT
2
+
8
C Sample signature definition
Given below is a snippet taken from the (N)LFSR signature
bundled with our implementation of the framework.
IDENTIFIER (Non-)Linear feedback shift register
VARIANT A
...
VARIANT C
TRANSIENT layer0:OR(AND(1,OPAQUE),OPAQUE<<1);
TRANSIENT layer1:OR(AND(1,OPAQUE),layer0<<1);
TRANSIENT layer2:OR(AND(1,OPAQUE),layer1<<1);
layer3:OR(AND(1,OPAQUE),layer2<<1);
D Implementation
An implementation of the framework described in this paper is
available for download14. It comes in the form of a plug-in for
the popular IDA disassembler. At the time of writing, support
is implemented for 32 bits ARM binaries. The architecture
is modular, and expanding support to other architectures is
relatively straightforward. Figure 11 shows a sample analysis
report, and a DFG plot generated by our implementation.
14https://github.com/wheres-crypto/wheres-crypto
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(a) Sample analysis report (b) DFG plot generated from assembly instructions indicating an LFSR
Figure 11: An impression of the implementation of our framework
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